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drawn from the KfW Mittelstandspanel, a representative survey of German SMEs for the
period from 2003 to 2009. We find evidence that female-owned firms are less likely to invest
and if they invest, then their average investment rate is lower. These differences cannot
entirely be explained by firm or owner characteristics. Furthermore, women’s investment
is less sensitive to cash flow, which indicates that it is unlikely that their lower investment
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1 Introduction
Female participation in business and entrepreneurship has increased considerably in the last
decades. Nonetheless, the gender gap between the entrepreneurial activity of men and women
is substantial, particularly in industrialized countries (Allen et al. 2007). Furthermore, firms
that are owned by women differ significantly from male-owned firms. Female entrepreneurs
have smaller firms, they start with less capital and are more likely to be found in the service
sector. Moreover, female-owned firms seem to underperform male-owned firms in profitability,
innovativeness and firm growth (Fairlie and Robb 2009, Gottschalk and Niefert 2011, Tonoyan
and Strohmeyer 2005).
Most studies find that this gender gap in firm performance - or at least a large part of
it - is attributable to differences in industry, human capital of the firm owner, professional
experience or access to finance and networks (Robb and Watson 2010, Du Rietz and Henrekson
2000). Yet, particularly for the performance indicators of sales growth and firm size, there still
remains a gender gap that cannot be explained with the usually observed firm- and owner-
specific characteristics. The standard explanations for this phenomenon can be subsumed to
two concepts: differences in growth and size between female- and male-owned firms are caused
either by discrimination or by preferences. Indeed, there is evidence that women prefer to keep
their businesses smaller and more manageable and that they are less likely to have growth on
their entrepreneurial agenda (Cliff 1998). Regarding discrimination in the form of financial
constraints, the proposition that women have more difficult access to external finance cannot
be validated for industrialized countries (Cole and Mehran 2009).
So far there is little knowledge about the underlying entrepreneurial decisions that reflect
those gender differences in preferences and also determine the differences in firm size. We do
not know much about how men and women act as firm owners and managers and how successful
they are. Particularly, gender differences in investment behavior are not well explored yet. This
question is highly relevant though, as firm investment is an important driver of firm growth.
The aim of this paper is to gain new insights into gender differences in investment activity
in order to contribute to a better understanding of observed lower growth rates and smaller firm
sizes of female-owned firms. For this purpose, we attempt to disentangle the impact of gender
on investment activity that remains after controlling for firm- and owner-specific characteristics,
such as industry, firm age, firm size, management team size, expectations, innovation activity,
cash flow as well as age and education of the firm owner. Using the KfW Mittelstandspanel,
a data set consisting of roughly 35,000 German SMEs that were observed from 2003 to 2009,
we focus on the extensive and intensive margin of investment as well as on stated investment
goals. Our analysis is threefold: first, we estimate a linear probability model (LPM) with
the binary investment decision as the dependent variable to examine the extensive margin of
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investment. Second, we analyze the investment rate, i.e. the intensive margin of investment, by
using a simple reduced form investment model with time-averaged data. Third, we examine the
investment goals of investing firms. We consider both standard explanations for women’s lower
firm sizes: discrimination in the form of financial constraints and preferences. The inclusion of
cash flow into the analysis of the extensive and intensive margin of investment serves as a control
for financial constraints. The analysis of investment goals sheds light on gender differences in
preferences.
Our results reveal that female firm owners are less inclined to invest, both at the extensive
and intensive margin. The probability that they make an investment is lower and if they invest,
the relative amount of their investment is lower on average, too. Moreover, we find that the
availability of internal funds in the form of cash flow does not have the same impact on male
and female firm owners’ investment behavior. The investment rate in female-owned firms reacts
less to a marginal increase in the availability of cash flow. This means that under the presence
of the same financial endowment women are more reluctant to invest. The explanation for this
behavior cannot directly be assessed within the estimation framework, but a further analysis
of the firms’ investment goals suggests that women are indeed less growth-oriented as they are
less likely to name sales increases, innovation/R&D and implementation of new products as
their investment goals.
We conclude that women’s lower propensity to invest and consequently also their lower firm
sizes are a consequence of preferences rather than financial constraints. We are not able to draw
any conclusion on the underlying causes for these gender differences in investment goals. We
have no information on personal conditions and resources of the firm owners that may affect
investment behavior and growth aspirations, such as attitudes towards risk taking, family sta-
tus and non-entrepreneurial responsibilities. However, previous research on gender differences
confirms that women are on average more risk and competition averse, less overconfident, less
ambitious and less work-centered. These findings may not only hold for the average women
but also to some extent for female entrepreneurs, particularly for owners of small, non-growing
firms.
2 Literature review on gender differences
Two strands of the economic literature are related to this paper: that on firm investment and
that on gender economics. Investment theory provides the background for the estimation of the
reduced form investment model and will briefly be discussed in Section 4.1. In the following,
we review the literature on gender differences in risk aversion, overconfidence, competition and
personal preferences. We discuss the impact of these findings on investment behavior of firm
owners.
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Research on gender differences in investment behavior has concentrated on private invest-
ment; there exists no evidence for firm investment. For private investors, Sunden and Surette
(1998) find that women choose retirement plan assets that are less risky than the average man’s
choice.
Gender differences in risk attitudes have been explored in field and laboratory experiments.
Most studies, in different environments and across a range of tasks, find that women have
on average a lower risk propensity than men (Dohmen and Falk 2011). Croson and Gneezy
(2009) outline three possible reasons for gender differences in risk taking: different evaluations
of risk, differences in the perceptibility of emotions and male overconfidence. On average,
men regard risk as challenge while women perceive it as threat. Moreover, women report
more intense nervousness and fear than men in anticipation of negative outcomes, they are
therefore more reluctant when it comes to a risky decision. These two explanations refer to
different assessments of identical situations. Overconfidence in contrast refers to differences
in the self-evaluation of one’s own abilities, knowledge and possibilities. Overconfident people
underestimate risk because they believe they are more capable than they actually are. Risk-
aversion should not be confounded with overconfidence (or even overoptimism), although the
two concepts are closely related. Rational non-overconfident people may differ in their true
risk preferences, while overconfident people underestimate risk because they are too confident
about their ability. Overoptimistic people, in contrast, have unrealistic and overly positive
expectations about the future. The literature indeed finds that men are more overconfident
than women, and particularly so in male-dominated areas such as finance (Odean and Barber
2001).
Schubert et al. (1999) argue that observed gender differences in risk attitudes in the average
population are possibly confounded with financial literacy and wealth effects due to gender-
specific income differences outside the laboratory. They claim that the experimental results
may not reflect true male and female attitudes towards financial risks, but may stand for
differences in individual opportunity sets. Under controlled economic conditions they find that
the comparative risk propensity in financial choices strongly depends on the decision frame and
that women do not generally make less risky financial choices than men.
Furthermore, while laboratory experiments may provide strong control of the economic
environment surrounding risky decisions they may not be adequate for drawing conclusions on
gender-specific risk attitudes of investors and managers. Indeed, most of these studies were
carried out with a subsample of the general population or with university students. Croson
and Gneezy (2009) point out that with a subsample consisting exclusively of business owners
and managers, gender differences in financial risk preferences may be smaller or not observable.
Entrepreneurs are a special subsample of the population with higher risk preferences than the
average. The fact that very few women decide to become business owners could therefore be
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partly the result of self-selection due to individual attitudes in risk aversion. Even though the
attitude towards risk is not the central determinant of becoming an entrepreneur, people that
choose entrepreneurial positions are on average more risk-taking (Blanchflower and Oswald
1998, Caliendo et al. 2009). Women who opt for entrepreneurial positions therefore might
have risk preferences similar to men. Yet, it also seems plausible that even within the group
of entrepreneurs there are gender differences in risk attitudes and behavior, particularly within
owners of small firms. Indeed, there is evidence that female entrepreneurs are less risk-taking
compared to their male counterparts (Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1990, Orobia et al. 2011).
Yet, there is also evidence on the opposite: Johnson and Powell (1994) investigate decision-
making characteristics of men and women in a ‘non-managerial’ population with those of a
‘managerial’ population. Males and females in the managerial population exhibit similar risk
propensity and make decisions of equal quality, while in the non-managerial population women
are more risk averse than men. Dwyer et al. (2002) come to a similar finding in a different
setting. They analyze whether the gender of an investor is related to risk taking in mutual
fund investment decisions. In line with the experimental literature they find that women are
less risk taking than men, but the impact of gender falls significantly when they control for
knowledge of financial markets.
Gender differences in attitudes toward competitive environments have been investigated in a
number of laboratory experiments, too. Gneezy et al. (2003) run an experiment where they test
for gender differences in performance generated by different incentive schemes. They observe
that with increasing competitiveness of the environment, the performance of men increases but
not that of women. However, in non-competitive environments there is no gender difference
in performance. Then again, when women compete in a purely female environment their
performance increases. It seems that women like to compete with other women but not against
men. As possible reasons the authors name women’s lower feelings of confidence and competence
and differences in the way how men and women compete against each other. Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007) have found that in choosing incentive schemes in an experimental setting men
select twice as often the competitive environment of a tournament, although ex-post there are
no gender differences in performance. This tournament-entry gap is driven by gender differences
in preferences for competitive environments and by male overconfidence. They conclude that
‘women shy away from competition and men embrace it’ (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, p.
1067).
Regarding differences in preferences, there is evidence that women on average do not mea-
sure success by the traditional ‘male’ indicators of growth and profitability and have different
motivations for opening their own businesses. Likewise, women view the value of work dif-
ferently than men. Hakim (2002) distinguishes three different lifestyles that are attributed to
social preferences: home-centered, work-centered and adaptive. She finds that a majority of
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men but only very few women are ‘work-centered’, meaning that work dominates their lives,
even though women have similar educational attainments and despite increasing female work
participation over the past three decades. Most women are ‘adaptive’, they prefer to combine
employment and family work in a balanced manner. Fairlie and Robb (2009) find that female
business owners may have different objectives for their businesses and that they work fewer
hours. One major difference between men and women is that women are more likely to report
that they own a business in order to be able to meet family responsibilities. These stated
preferences are presumably a result of social norms. Women traditionally take more responsi-
bility for family and child care. They need to balance work and family on average more than
work-centered men do. This of course may have implications for the outcomes of female-owned
businesses and may induce women to keep their firms smaller and more manageable.
The objective of this paper is to find out whether and how male and female business owners
differ in their investment decisions. We summarize the discussed findings as follows: in economic
experiments and laboratory settings, women are on average more risk-averse, less overconfident
and less eager to participate in competitive environments. Moreover, women have different
preferences and entrepreneurial objectives, they are less growth-oriented and have lower goals
concerning their desired firm size. There are good reasons to believe that the described personal
attributes have an impact on investment behavior. Lower growth aspirations may result in
lower investment rates. Moreover, firm investment involves risk-taking and requires certain
confidence in the assessment of the ex-ante unknown profitability of the investment. Based on
these considerations we expect - if the discussed findings hold for female business owners, too -
the following two results: first, women are less likely to invest, and second, if they invest, they
invest lower amounts.
3 Data and descriptives
3.1 Data source
The analysis is based on the KfW Mittelstandspanel, an annual firm survey which has been
conducted since 2003 by the KfW Bankengruppe, a German public bank in the ownership of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal States. Among other business activities, the
KfW offers financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The collection
of the data was initialized by the KfW Research Division in order to learn more about SMEs
as their main clients - their financing needs, innovative behavior, activities abroad, economic
situation, earnings situation, equity resources, expectations, access to investment and venture
capital, in short: everything that is relevant to SMEs and SME policy. The data set is available
to external researchers only upon request and only for research on predetermined topics. The
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KfW-Mittelstandspanel is the only panel data set which is representative of all German SMEs.
It includes firms with maximum annual sales of 500 million Euro without having restrictions
on the number of employees. The inclusion of very small firms is important for our analysis,
as female-owned firms are typically very small. Furthermore, the survey provides information
on characteristics of the firm owner such as gender, age and education - a feature that is
not available in most public data sets. The owner characteristics are available only for one
firm owner or associate even if the firm has more than one owner, so we assume that the
information holds for the most influential owner. Additionally, we have information on the
size of the management team, consisting of active and responsible executive directors, owners
and associates of the firm. The sample of the survey was selected using stratified random
sampling. The stratification was done according to six size groups (less than 5 employees, 5-9,
10-19, 20-49, 50-99 and 100 or more employees), five industries (manufacturing, construction,
retail, wholesale and services), region (West and East Germany), and participation in a KfW
support program for SMEs. Firms that are located in East Germany are oversampled. Small
and service firms are underrepresented compared to the population, therefore the share of large
and industry firms is higher in the sample than in the population. As a result, the share of
female-owned firms is underrepresented as these are prevalently small and belong to the service
sector. Yet, in the regressions we control for all stratification variables. The survey, which is
six pages long, was sent by mail to the firms for the first time in 2003 and has been repeated in
every following year. Participation in the survey is voluntary, some firms dropped out, others
did not respond in every single year. New firms were included in 2005, 2007 and 2009 in
order to keep the sample size constant. The survey achieved response rates between 18.2%
and 23.4%, which is in the typical range for medium-length mail surveys without incentive to
participate for SMEs.1 This corresponds to 9,000 to 15,000 observations for each year. The
panel is unbalanced, therefore the time dimension of the data is limited. 58% of the firms are
observed only once, 6,800 firms have participated at least three times and more than 1,000
SMEs have participated in all years.2
3.2 Regression sampling and descriptives
The analysis is based on three sub-samples. For the first regression in Section 4.4 we use the
largest sub-sample, which is based on 34,234 firms with a total of 80,543 observations over time.
We exclude observations with extreme values. These are those below the 0.5th and above the
99.5th percentiles-bound for the variables sales, sales growth, employment growth and return
on sales. The use of lagged values requires at least two subsequent observations for each firm
1Mail survey response rates for SMEs are lower than for large firms. Bartholomev and Smith (2006) have
reviewed mail surveys published in ‘Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice’ and ‘Journal of Small Business
Management’ over the period 1998-2004 and have found an average response rate of 27%.
2A detailed description of the data set in German language can be found in Reize (2010).
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and with the further restriction of non-missing entries in the regression variables the number
of observations reduces to 20,254 in the first regression. The second regression in Section 4.5
restricts the data set to firms that are observed in every single year between 2006 to 2009,
therefore the sample shrinks to 1,389 observations. For the third regression, which is discussed
in Section 4.6, we consider only those firms that have invested and have stated their investment
goals, reducing the sample size therefore to 7,194 observations.
Table 1 provides the variable descriptions and Table 2 descriptive statistics disaggregated
by gender for the first and largest regression sample. There are statistically significant gender
differences in several dimensions. Female entrepreneurs are on average three years younger
and their firms are younger, too. As expected, female-owned firms are smaller in terms of
sales and employees and they are more likely to be organized as sole proprietorships and less
likely as a corporation. Consequently a larger share of male-owned firms have more than
three owners and/or managers. Female-owned firms are rarely active in the manufacturing
and construction industries and more often active in services, particularly retail and hotel and
restaurant industries.3 Female-owned firms’ propensity to invest and to innovate is lower and
they are less likely to have positive sales expectations.
In Figure 1 we present results from kernel density estimates of the distributions of the logs
of number of employees and sales for female- and male-owned firms. The dashed line represents
male-owned firms while the solid line depicts female-owned firms. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test rejects the null hypothesis that the male and female distributions are equally distributed
with a p-value of 0.000 for both variables.
Since the interpretation of simple means of performance measures may be misleading, we
run a simple random effects GLS regression of firm performance in terms of sales growth (Table
3). We control for education, age of the firm and the owner, firm size, management team size
and industry. We find that female owners have significantly lower growth rates, which is in
line with previous findings on gender and firm growth. We are aware that this regression is
just a very basic attempt to separate the impact of female ownership from other underlying
variables that might have an influence on growth and may be correlated with female ownership.
However, the aim of this simple regression is to confirm the finding that female-owned firms
have lower growth rates with our data. Our main question of interest is investment behavior.
As investment is an important determinant of firm growth and size, our analysis contributes to
a better understanding of existing differences in firm size and growth.
3The data set contains firms from 55 industries according to the NACE industry classification. In order to
create industry dummy variables that comprise a reasonable number of female-owned firms, we merge these
55 industries into eight categories.
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Table 1: Variable descriptions
Owner characteristics
Female owner (d) 1 if the principal firm owner/manager is female, 0 else
Graduate (d) 1 if the firm owner has graduated from an institution of 
higher education, 0 else
Age firm owner (c) Age of the firm owner
Firm characteristics
FTE (c) Number of full time employees (FTEs) including the firm owner 
Sales (c) Amount of sales in Euro
FTE (log) (c) Logarithm of the number of full time employees (FTEs) incl. firm owner 
Sales (log) (c) Logarithm of the amount of sales 
Sales growth (c) Growth rate of sales
Cash flow (c) Earnings before taxes+depreciation 
Cash flow/sales (c) Cashlow divided by total lagged sales
Demeaned cashflow (c) Deviation of cashflow from the sample mean
Firm age <5 years (d) 1 if the firm is less than 5 years old, 0 else (reference category)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 1 if the firm is between 5 and 10 years old, 0 else
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 1 if the firm is between 11 and 20 years old, 0 else
Firm age >20 years (d) 1 if the firm is more than 20 years old, 0 else
1 owner-manager (d) 1 if the firm has 1 active owner-manager, 0 else (reference category)
2 owners/managers (d) 1 if the firm has 2 active owners/managers, 0 else
3 or more owners/managers (d) 1 if the firm has 3 or more active owners/managers, 0 else
Investment (d) 1 if the firm has invested, 0 else
Innovation (d) 1 if the firm has innovation activities, 0 else
Sales expectations positive (d) 1 if the expectation for next year's sales is positive, 0 else
Stratification variables and industry dummies
KfW support (d) 1 if the firm has received a KfW promotional loan, 0 else
Region (d) 1 if the firm is located in East Germany,  0 if the firm is located in 
West Germany
Manufacturing (d) 1 if the firm is in manufacturing industry, 0 else (reference category)
Construction (d) 1 if the firm is in construction industry, 0 else
Retail and wholesale (d) 1 if the firm is in retail and wholesale industry, 0 else
Hotel and restaurants (d) 1 if the firm is in hotel and restaurant industry, 0 else
Transport, finance, data processing (d) 1 if the firm is in transport, finance or data processing industry, 0 else
Commercial services (d) 1 if the firm is in commercial services, 0 else
Other business-related services (d) 1 if the firm is in other business-related services, 0 else
Other industry (d) 1 if the firm is in another industry, 0 else
Legal form dummies
Sole proprietorship (d) 1 if the firm is in sole proprietorship, 0 else (reference category)
Private limited company (d) 1 if the firm is a private limited company, 0 else
Limited liability company (d) 1 if the firm is a limited liability company, 0 else
Corporation (d) 1 if the firm is a corporation, 0 else
Other legal form (d) 1 if the firm has another legal form, 0 else
Notes: d = dummy variable, c = continuous variable
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Table 2: Summary statistics regression sample
Gender variable Mean St.dev. Min. Max.
Female owner (d) 0.116 0.321 0 1
t-test 
Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Owner characteristics
Graduate (d) 0.540 0.498 0 1 0.524 0.499 0 1 0.140
Age firm owner 48.432 9.944 20 80 44.909 9.025 23 78 0.000***
Firm characteristics
FTE 33.3 54.2 0.5 1253 20.2 36.0 0.5 462 0.000***
Sales (in million Euro) 5.349 10.030 10 104 2.620 6.894 10 102 0.000***
Sales growth 0.041 0.298 -1.542 2.037 0.038 0.276 -1.538 2.004 0.745
Cash flow (in thousand Euro) 327 669 -320 8,150 189 510 -307 6,800 0.000***
Firm age  31.280 36.29 1 384 27.022 34.579 1 312 0.000***
Firm age <5 years (d) 0.151 0.358 0 1 0.242 0.428 0 1 0.000***
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.160 0.366 0 1 0.187 0.390 0 1 0.001***
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.285 0.452 0 1 0.239 0.427 0 1 0.000***
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.404 0.491 0 1 0.332 0.471 0 1 0.000***
1 owner-manager (d) 0.586 0.492 0 1 0.604 0.489 0 1 0.093
2 owners/managers (d) 0.274 0.446 0 1 0.272 0.445 0 1 0.848
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.107 0.310 0 1 0.079 0.269 0 1 0.000***
Investment (d) 0.650 0.477 0 1 0.537 0.499 0 1 0.000***
Innovation (d) 0.505 0.500 0 1 0.399 0.490 0 1 0.000***
Sales expectations positive (d) 0.309 0.462 0 1 0.272 0.445 0 1 0.000***
Stratification variables 
KfW support (d) 0.682 0.466 0 1 0.687 0.009 0 1 0.602
Region (d) 0.404 0.491 0 1 0.432 0.010 0 1 0.007***
Industry dummies
Manufacturing (d) 0.298 0.457 0 1 0.185 0.389 0 1 0.000***
Construction (d) 0.187 0.390 0 1 0.082 0.274 0 1 0.000***
Retail and wholesale (d) 0.263 0.440 0 1 0.313 0.464 0 1 0.000***
Hotel and restaurants (d) 0.032 0.175 0 1 0.080 0.272 0 1 0.000***
Transport, finance, 
data processing (d)
0.040 0.196 0 1 0.035 0.183 0 1 0.206
Commercial services (d) 0.094 0.291 0 1 0.102 0.302 0 1 0.219
Other business-related services (d) 0.070 0.256 0 1 0.195 0.396 0 1 0.000***
Other (d) 0.016 0.124 0 1 0.007 0.002 0 1 0.002***
Legal form dummies
Sole proprietorship (d) 0.306 0.461 0 1 0.488 0.500 0 1 0.000***
Private limited (d) 0.074 0.262 0 1 0.078 0.269 0 1 0.503
Limited partnership (d) 0.110 0.313 0 1 0.070 0.255 0 1 0.000***
Limited liability corporation (d) 0.502 0.500 0 1 0.354 0.010 0 1 0.000***
Other legal form (d) 0.007 0.083 0 1 0.010 0.098 0 1 0.139
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the sample used in the estimation of a linear probability random effects panel GLS model 
of investment in Table 3.4. N = 20,254. Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means under the assumption of equal 
variances. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Male owner Female owner
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates, size in terms of sales and number of employees
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Table 3: Random effects panel GLS regression of firm growth
Dependent variable: Sales growth 
Female owner (d) -0.044***
(0.007)
Graduate owner (d) 0.013**
(0.005)
Age firm owner -0.001**
(0.0002)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.101***
(0.006)
Lagged sales (log) -0.122***
(0.005)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.089***
(0.009)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.109***
(0.008)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.110***
(0.008)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.024***
(0.006)
3 or more owners/managers (d) 0.035***
(0.008)
Constant 1.538***
(0.064)
R-squared (overall) 0.070
Observations 20,254
Female observations 2,361
Firms 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for 
the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard errors. The regression 
includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables.
The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are 
younger than 5 years and have one manager. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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4 Econometric analysis of gender and firm investment
4.1 Estimating investment functions
Several theoretical models attempt to describe the complex process of firm investment. Com-
mon to almost all recent models is that investment is considered as a dynamic optimization
problem. Hence, a firms lives many periods and increases its optimal, long-run or equilibrium
level capital stock by investing. Firms decide to invest or not given real and financial factors.
Due to limited funds current and future investment are interdependent. Moreover, investment
and its financing have further intertemporal effects on future profitability and future financing
constraints.
When it comes to the empirical estimation of the investment process, a large part of the
empirical investment literature is based on the Q investment model (Tobin and Brainard 1977)
where investment opportunities are measured by the ratio of market to book value of a firm’s
assets. For the present analysis the Q model is not applicable as the KfW Mittelstandspanel
does not provide information on stock market participation. Anyhow, as most of the firms are
rather small, it can be assumed that they are not listed on the stock market. In neoclassical
models investment demand is determined by measures of output and cost of capital. However,
the data set does not contain information on firm-specific cost of capital. The use of an Euler
equation as theoretical underpinning does not come into consideration, either, because of the
strictly implied assumption of convex adjustment costs of investment. Convex adjustment
costs imply that with increasing amounts of investment the adjustment costs that a firm has to
bear grow over-proportionally. This results in investment smoothing: yearly firm investment is
continuous over the years and there are no investment spikes over time. This assumption may
hold for large firms, but what we observe in the data is that a significant fraction of firms show
large variation in investment activity between years. Particularly for small firms investment
is a lumpy activity, most of them do not invest in every year. Periods of larger amounts of
investment are followed by periods of zero investment. The reason for this behavior is that
larger investment projects (e.g. purchase of a production facility) cannot be smoothed over
time and many firms cannot afford to invest every year or rather do not need or want to invest
in every year.
Based on these technical limitations we start our analysis with an estimation of a linear
probability random effects panel GLS model of the investment decision in order to assess gender
differences in the probability of investing. To analyze the investment rate, we opt for a reduced
form model of investment which is not explicitly derived from an optimal investment behavior
assumption and has no specified structure of adjustment costs.4 Furthermore we investigate
4Bond and Van Reenen (2007, p. 4443) point out that these type of models ‘represent just an empirical
approximation to some more complex underlying process that has generated the data’.
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gender differences in investment goals, also with a linear probability random effects panel GLS
model. Finally, we conduct several robustness checks. We re-estimate the investment decision
and the investment goals with a panel probit model and the investment rate, with a panel tobit
approach. Furthermore, we reduce the two samples to firms with only one owner-manager to
make sure that the decision maker in the firm is indeed female. These modifications in sample
size and estimation method do not alter our central findings.
4.2 Cash flow as indicator for financial constraints
Cash flow, the amount of internal funds that are available to a firm for financing investment
projects and other expenses, is a measure for a firm’s financial power. Financial factors such
as the availability of internal funds, access to external finance as well as the quality of credit
markets are important determinants of firm investment. A firm can be considered as financially
unconstrained if it has no difficulties to finance the desired investment level, neither through
internal nor external funds. The investment literature uses different strategies to identify and to
measure financial constraints. One approach is to identify financial constraints by including a
firm’s cash flow into the investment equation as a measure of internal liquidity. The first study
that worked with cash flow as an indicator for financial constraints was written by Fazzari et al.
(1988). The resulting regression coefficient, the ‘investment-cash flow sensitivity’, represents the
potential sensitivity of investment to fluctuations in available internal finance. A significant cash
flow coefficient can be interpreted as evidence of financing constraints. The intuition behind
is that if investment activity reacts strongly to a good internal financial situation (higher cash
flow), then external funds must be to expensive for the firm or to difficult to acquire.
However, due to interpretation ambiguities and the absence of theoretical justifications, the
use of cash flow as measure for financial constraints is highly controversial. Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) argue that there is no strong theoretical reason to expect a monotonic relationship
between investment-cash flow sensitivity and the degree of financial constraints. Their empirical
results show that a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be interpreted as evidence
that a firm is more financially constrained, therefore investment-cash flow sensitivities are
questionable indicators for financing constraints. Another part of the Kaplan and Zingales
critique refers to problems that arise within regressions of the Q-model, mainly caused by
measurement error on the ratio of market to book value of a firm’s assets. These doubts however
should not cause problems in our analysis as we do not employ the Q-model. Yet another point
of criticism that matters for our analysis is that the interpretation of cash flow is ambiguous
because it may contain information about expected future profits. A good cash flow situation
may lead to positive expectations about future profits. Without controlling for sales or profit
expectations, the finding of a significant coefficient on cash flow cannot directly be interpreted
as evidence of financing constraints, as the cash flow variable could pick up expectations. These
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expectations on future profits again are relevant for the investment decision, too (Bond et al.
2003). Since we are able to control for expectations about future sales, this concern is probably
not relevant for our analysis.
In light of these considerations the use of cash flow is appropriate within our estimation
framework. Furthermore, we are interested in gender-specific differences in the reactions to
an increase in cash flow rather than in the effect and interpretation of cash flow itself. For
this purpose, we create a new variable by interacting demeaned cash flow with the dummy
variable for female ownership, as the magnitude of the impact of cash flow on investment may
be different for female-owned firms. The interaction term approach has the main advantage
that we can explicitly test differences in the investment-cash flow sensitivity of male and female
firm owners.
4.3 Gender as proxy for personals traits
As we have stated before, if previous findings on gender differences in risk-aversion, overcon-
fidence and lifestyle preferences hold to some extent for entrepreneurs, too, we expect female
business owners to invest less. We have no information on risk aversion, overconfidence and
preferences in our data, but we can assume that under the assumption of no gender discrimina-
tion the pure gender effect on investment is zero or at least negligible once we could control for
these personal traits. However, estimating an investment model without in some way account-
ing for these factors would result in an omitted variable bias. The inclusion of the binary gender
variable can be considered as a proxy variable to catch these features. Wooldridge (2009, p.
307) calls this the ‘plug-in solution to the omitted variables problem’.
The true model to be estimated would be
E(Ii) = αi + β1Xi + β2Di + β3Zi + ui
whereX denotes a vector of firm-specific characteristics, D is a vector of observed owner-specific
characteristics (age and education of the firm owner) and Z is a vector of unobserved personal
traits that influence investment behavior positively, such as risk-propensity, over-confidence and
work-centered or growth-oriented preferences. Being female is negatively correlated with risk-
propensity, over-confidence and work-centered as well as growth-oriented preferences, but there
are no theoretical reasons to believe that gender itself has an impact on investment behavior.
We cannot observe Z, but we are interested in gender differences in investment behavior that
result from gender differences in Z, therefore we estimate
E(Ii) = αi + β1Xi + β2Di + β3fi + ui
where f denotes a dummy variable for female ownership.
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4.4 Investment at the extensive margin: probability of investing
What is the probability that a female-owned firm invests, compared to a male-owned firm,
and how does this probability change when we control for other influencing variables? In
order to answer this question, we estimate a linear probability model (LPM) by virtue of its
easy and straightforward interpretation. The regression coefficients should be interpreted as
changes in the predicted probability of investing if the respective independent variable increases
by one unit. Our estimation equation with the binary investment decision (invested=1, not
invested=0) as dependent variable takes the form
E(Ii) = P (Ii = 1) = αi + β1Xi + β2Di + β3fi + ui
where f denotes a dummy variable for female ownership, X is a vector of firm-specific charac-
teristics (size in terms of sales and employees, cash flow, firm age, team size, sales expectations,
innovation activity and sales growth) and D is a vector of further owner-specific characteristics
(age of the firm owner and graduate status). One of the shortcomings of the LPM are het-
eroskedastic error terms, therefore we employ a cluster-robust form for the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimator (VCE) as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) by clustering on
firm-level.
Table 4 displays the results from five different regressions. In specification (1) we see that the
raw probability difference between investing male and female firm owners amounts to 0.108.
The probability that a female-owned firm invests is 10.8 percentage points lower than for a
male-owned firm. Including industry dummies in specification (2) does not alter this difference
substantially. This is in line with Fairlie and Robb (2009) who find that industry distributions
are not a major explanation for gender gaps in business outcomes. In contrast, the additional
inclusion of firm size in specification (3) leads to a substantial reduction of the gender difference
in the probability of investing of about six percentage points to 0.049. Controlling for additional
firm- and owner-specific variables does not reduce this difference considerably. Specification (5)
shows that even after considering further firm- and owner-specific characteristics there still
remains a significant gender difference of 3.3 percentage points in the likelihood to invest.
We conclude that size in terms of full time equivalent employees seems to account for the
largest bulk of the gender difference in the probability to invest. Furthermore, firm size has
the largest explanatory power in the model as with the inclusion of firm size the R2 increases
from 0.032 to 0.125. In order to check whether the gender effect on investment is constant
over different firm size categories, we re-estimate specification (5) with interaction terms of
female ownership with size categories. We repeat this procedure with firm age instead of
size. We plot the interaction effects against the constant effect from a regression without
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Table 4: Linear probability random effects panel GLS model of investment
Dependent variable: investment (0/1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.108*** -0.097*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.033***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.046***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Lagged sales (log) 0.044*** 0.061***
(0.005) (0.005)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.054*** -0.038***
(0.012) (0.012)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.071*** -0.049***
(0.012) (0.012)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.065*** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.012)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.035*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.009)
3 or more managers/owners (d) 0.027** 0.017
(0.012) (0.012)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.051*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.007)
Graduate (d) 0.024*** 0.012
(0.008) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Innovation activities (d) 0.112***
(0.007)
Sales growth 0.170***
(0.011)
Cash flow/lagged sales 0.032***
(0.008)
Demeaned cash flow*female 0.010
(0.008)
Constant 0.617*** 0.686*** 0.348*** -0.055 -0.356***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.062) (0.063)
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Legal form dummies no no no yes yes
R-squared 0.019 0.032 0.125 0.140 0.174
Observations 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254
Female observations 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level 
cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes time, industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification
variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have 
one owner-manager.*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 2: Constant effect of female ownership vs. interaction with size categoriesConstant coefficient `female´ vs. interaction with size
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interactions in Figures 2 and 3.5 We find that women’s lower probability of investing does not
vary systematically with increasing size or firm age.
4.5 Investment at the intensive margin: investment rates
From an econometric point of view, the process of firm investment with its autoregressive dis-
tributed lags would be most appropriately estimated within the dynamic econometric framework
of a system GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). Yet, the estimation of a dynamic specification is not very promising when considering
that the time dimension of our panel is very short with only seven years’ data and moreover,
only very few firms are present during the whole time period.
Due to these data limitations we are confined to estimate a simple OLS regression of a
reduced form model with time-averaged data. In doing so, we follow Addison et al. (2007)
who analyze the impact of works councils on investment. We adopt their approach to examine
gender differences in investment. The basic estimation equation can be written as:
Ii,2008+Ii,2009
2
= α + β1fi + β2
CFi,2008+CFi,2009
2
+ β3DemCFi ∗ fi + γXi + u
where I in the dependent variable denotes the investment rate, the amount invested divided by
5see Appendix Tables 10 and 11 for the regression results.
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Figure 3: Constant effect of female ownership vs. interaction with age categoriesConstant coefficient `female´ vs. inter tions with firm age
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lagged sales. We average the investment rate over two years in order to ensure that there are
no investment spikes in the data and that investment is smoothed over the years. f is a dummy
variable for female ownership. We average cash flow (CF ) over the years 2008 and 2009, too.
DemCF ∗ f stands for demeaned cash flow interacted with the dummy variable for female
ownership. X represents a vector of the standard control variables in investment functions
and includes also the lagged investment rate that serves as a rough depiction of the dynamic
adjustment process of investment. Furthermore, we include sales growth as an explanatory
variable, since fluctuations in sales or output motivate changes in investment spending. Sales
or output growth has a positive impact on firm investment and vice versa. Increasing sales imply
that a firm expects rising profits and cash flow as well as a higher degree of existing capacity
utilization. This usually implies that profit expectations rise and this again encourages firms to
invest more e.g. in buildings or machinery (accelerator effect). According to investment theory
firms take into account expectations of the future when they decide about their investment
strategy. Firms invest when the expected return on investment (ROI) exceeds their costs of
investing. Positive expectations of future sales boosts investment whereas negative expectations
may constrain investment. To incorporate the role of expectations aside from the growth rate
of sales we include two dummy variables for positive expectations for the years 2009 and 2010.
The firms were asked whether they expect their sales situation to improve, to deteriorate or
to stay unchanged next year. Aspiring investment intentions may not necessarily be reflected
in current growth rate or in sales expectations. Therefore we also include a dummy variable
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for ambitious investment goals that takes the value 1 if the firm has stated implementation
of new products, innovation/R&D or sales increases as an objective for its investment (see
Section 4.6 for more details). We control for firm size and industry. There should exist a
positive relationship between a firm’s size and its investment as larger firms have easier access
to finance and more ability to bear higher risks (Fazzari et al. 1988). Investment patterns also
vary between different industries. Usually manufacturing firms are more capital intensive than
services and some industries may experience sector-specific business cycles.
Table 5: OLS regression of the average investment rate in 2008/2009
Dependent var: Investment rate 
(Investment/lagged sales, averaged 
over 2008/2009) (1) (1A) (2) (2A) (3) (3A) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.013** -0.014*** -0.012** -0.014*** -0.009* -0.011** -0.010* -0.010*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Investment/sales 2006/2007 0.232*** 0.219*** 0.200*** 0.188*** 0.193*** 0.181*** 0.190*** 0.175***
(0.049) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042) (0.048) (0.042) (0.047) (0.044)
Growth rate sales 2008/2009 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.045**
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020)
FTE (log) 2007 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash flow/lagged sales 2008/2009 0.167*** 0.163*** 0.198*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 0.171***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) (0.039)
Cash flow*female -0.148*** -0.157*** -0.149*** -0.138***
(0.050) (0.045) (0.049) (0.045)
Sales expectation for 2010 pos. (d) 0.017*** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006)
Sales expectation for 2009 pos. (d) 0.005 0.004
(0.008) (0.007)
Ambitious investment goals (d) 0.044***
(0.005)
Constant 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.015 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.001
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 1,389 1,598 1,389 1,598 1,389 1,598 1,389 1,389
Female observations 155 183 155 183 155 183 155 155
R-squared 0.146 0.144 0.184 0.182 0.191 0.191 0.199 0.248
Notes: This table presents the results of an OLS regression with robust standard errors and time-averaged data for the years 2006-2009. Each 
regression includes industry and legal form dummies as well as the stratification variables. Regressions (1A)-(1C) are repetitions of regressions 
(1)-(3) with a larger sample that due to missing entries in expectations and investment goals could not be used for (4) and (5). The reference 
category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 5 reports the results from five OLS regressions of the reduced form investment equation.
We use a sub-sample of firms that are observed in each single year from 2006-2009. We include
only firms that have invested at least once in those years. Table 9 in the Appendix contains
the summary statistics for this reduced sample. Investing firms are larger and are more likely
to be organized as a corporation than non-investing firms. Moreover, the share of firm owners
that hold a graduate degree is higher.
Again, we start with a basic specification in (1) that does not include cash flow, the interac-
tion term and the dummy variables for positive expectations and ambitious investment goals.
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We gradually include these variables in specifications (2)-(5). As the number of observations
is quite small, we re-estimate the smaller specifications (1)-(3) with all available observations
(1A)-(3A). All control variables enter the regressions with the expected signs. Lagged invest-
ment and sales growth are positively correlated with investment and so are expectations and
ambitious goals. The coefficient for cash flow is significant and shows the expected sign, firms
with higher internal funds are more inclined to invest higher amounts. Interestingly, the neg-
ative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that cash flow has a greater impact on the
investment rate of male-owned firms than of female-owned firms.
The dummy variable for female ownership has a negative sign and is significant in all spec-
ifications, suggesting a higher degree of investment reluctance for women. The significance
decreases from the 1% level in (1) and (2) to merely 10% in (4) and (5) and the size of the
coefficient reduces from 0.014 to 0.010 as we include more explanatory variables. However, the
gender difference is economically not trivial. Using the coefficients from specification (5), we
calculate an exemplary investment rate of 0.081 for a male-owned firm and 0.07 for a female-
owned firm with the same characteristics.6 With 1 mio. Euro annual sales, a male-owned firm
would invest 81,000 Euro and a female-owned firm only 70,000 Euro which makes a non-trivial
difference of about 15%.
This result is open to multiple interpretations and cannot completely be explained within the
regression framework. We might reason that female-owned firms are apparently less financially
constrained because they react less to an increase in cash flow. However, the results confirm
our expectation that gender differences in risk-aversion, over-confidence and attitudes towards
entrepreneurship may result in lower investment activity. Yet, all these assertions are pure
speculation as they cannot be tested directly within the investment function. A further analysis
of the investment goals in the next section reveals that there are gender differences in the stated
reasons for investing. These differences may also serve as a valid explanation for women’s lower
investment activity.
4.6 Investment goals
Investing firms stated their motivations for the previous year’s investment by choosing be-
tween eight pre-formulated non mutually exclusive investment goals: environment protection,
rationalization (cost cutting), implementation of new products, technical replacements, inno-
vation/R&D, governmental requirements, sales increases and other goals. We identify three
goals as growth-oriented and/or risky investment goals: implementation of new products, in-
novation/R&D and sales increases. The other reasons (environment protection, cost cutting,
6We use the following values for this calculation: investment rate in 2006/2007: 0.05, growth rate sales
2008/2009; 0.01, 18.5 FTEs, cash flow/sales: 0.11, positive expectations for 2009 and 2010 and ambitious
investment goals.
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technical replacements and governmental requirements) can be viewed as entrepreneurial ne-
cessities which can take place without the intention for growing or expanding.
Table 6: Summary statistics investment goals
t-test 
Investment goals Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev. p-value
Environment protection 0.105 0.306 0.076 0.265 0.015**
Rationalization 0.527 0.5 0.471 0.5 0.004***
Implementation new products 0.309 0.462 0.252 0.434 0.001***
Technical replacements 0.599 0.49 0.613 0.487 0.475
Innovation / R&D 0.116 0.32 0.052 0.223 0.000***
Governmental requirements 0.061 0.239 0.089 0.286 0.003***
Sales increase 0.492 0.5 0.424 0.494 0.001***
Other goals 0.073 0.26 0.105 0.306 0.002***
Average number of stated goals 2.282 1.109 2.083 1.045 0.000***
Male owner Female owner
Notes: the variables take the value 1 if the firm has indicated the respective goal, 0 else. Comparison 
of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means unser the assumption of equal variances. *,** 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 7: Correlation table investment goals
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Environment protection 1
Rationalization 0.102* 1
Implementation new products -0.011 -0.061* 1
Technical replacements 0.075* 0.038* -0.119* 1
Innovation / R&D 0.065* 0.011 0.176* -0.006 1
Governmental requirements 0.123* 0.008 -0.024 0.038* -0.008 1
Sales increase -0.003 0.029 0.184* -0.171* 0.142* -0.014 1
Other goals -0.055* -0.180* -0.121* -0.183* -0.069* -0.026 -0.119*
Notes: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 6 and 7 show summary statistics and a correlation table of investment goals. The growth
oriented goals are significantly correlated to each other and are more often stated by male firm
owners than by female owners. We estimate a linear probability random effects GLS model for
each investment goal separately (Table 8).
The explanatory variables are the same as in the estimation of the binary investment decision.
The only regressions where the dummy variable for female ownership is significant with a neg-
ative sign are those for the growth-oriented and risky investment goals. Hence, the probability
that a female business owner indicates that she strives for these investment goals is significantly
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Table 8: Linear probability model of investment goals
Dependent variable:
Investment goal (0/1)
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Other
goals
Female owner (d) -0.018 -0.009 -0.049** 0.015 -0.040*** 0.018 -0.054** 0.019
(0.012) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.002 0.070*** -0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.039*** -0.009
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
Lagged sales (log) 0.012* -0.009 0.004 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.002 0.045* -0.008 0.004 -0.001 0.013 -0.027 -0.007
(0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.004 0.010 -0.030 0.062*** -0.027* -0.002 -0.058** -0.014
(0.013) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.013)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.020 0.033 -0.054** 0.077*** -0.055*** 0.013 -0.106*** -0.016
(0.014) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014)
Sales expect. positive (d) -0.016** -0.002 0.047*** -0.046*** 0.031*** -0.001 0.150*** -0.002
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
Graduate owner (d) -0.032*** 0.004 -0.031** 5.45e-06 0.029*** -0.012* -0.052*** 0.008
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.002*** 0.001** -0.0007* -0.001 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.005 -0.008 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.0002 0.016 -0.003
(0.009) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
3 or more owners/managers (d) -0.012 0.017 -0.031 5.37e-05 0.003 -0.009 0.002 0.017
(0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.011)
Sales growth 0.023* 0.033 -0.022 -0.014 0.007 -0.003 0.165*** -0.035***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
Cash flow in t/sales t-1 -0.0001 0.001*** 0.0001 -0.002*** -0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002)
Constant -0.002 0.525*** 0.331*** 0.468*** -0.021 0.065 0.403*** 0.120*
(0.085) (0.127) (0.111) (0.126) (0.079) (0.071) (0.124) (0.064)
R-squared overall 0.030 0.060 0.038 0.027 0.075 0.016 0.028 0.097
Observations 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194
Female observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726
Firms 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999
Avg. obs. per firm 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: This table presents the results of a linear probability random effects panel regression with robust standard errors for the years 2005-2009. Only 
investing firms considered. The definitions and constructions of the variables can be found in Table 1. Each regression includes industry dummies as well 
as a dummy for region and participation in a promotional loan program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
lower. For women the probability of pursuing these investment goals is about 0.05 lower for
sales increases and implementation of new products and 0.04 lower for innovation/R&D. For
the other investment goals there is no statistically significant gender difference. This result
contributes to a better understanding of the puzzling outcome that women react less to an
increase in cash flow. We can infer that female-owned firms are on average less eager to expand
and to invest in more risky business areas. This may also be an explanation for the fact that
- even with higher cash flow - female firm owners invest less and are less inclined to increase
their investments. One caveat of the regression may be the relatively low explanatory power of
the estimated model with an R2 between 0.027 and 0.097.
4.7 Robustness checks
In order to validate our findings we employ several robustness checks for each regression. These
robustness checks essentially confirm our findings from the main regressions, as the signs and
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the significances do not differ substantially.
1. Check: other model specification, panel probit instead of LPM.
Typically, binary dependent variables are estimated with non-linear regression models. We
therefore re-run the regressions of the binary investment decision (Section 4.4) and the invest-
ment goals (Section 4.6) with a panel probit model (Appendix Tables 12 and 13).
2. Check: other model specification, tobit instead of OLS.
The investment rate in our data is a censored variable. We have a significant proportion of
zero outcomes for investment and we do not know which part of these zeros are latent non-zero
observations. In other words, we do not know if the zero observations for investment are ‘true’
zeros because the firm owner did not want to invest or if the zeros are in fact negative observa-
tions, firms that could not invest. We have tried to overcome this problem by time-averaging
the data in the estimation of an investment function in Section 4.5. However, the standard
approach for this type of analysis is the use of censored regression models. In using a censored
regression model it would be appropriate to estimate a two part (or Heckman) model to over-
come the strong assumption of one part models that the same probability mechanism generates
both the zeros and the positives values. These models, however, need at least one exclusion
variable that has a substantial impact on the probability of selection but not on the positive
outcome variable for robust identification. Unfortunately we are not able to justify any of the
available variables as exogenous for the investment rate but substantial for the selection into
investing. We therefore re-run the OLS regression of the investment rate with a tobit maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE). However, the tobit approach is based on strong assumptions about
the conditional data distribution and functional form. These strong assumptions are likely to
be violated and this makes the tobit MLE a non-robust estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).
Using the tobit model we are able to estimate the regressions with a larger sample compared
to the small sample size of the OLS regression, as we do not need to time-average the data
(Appendix Table 14).
3. Check: considering only firms with one owner.
We only have information about the gender of the primary firm owner and not about all
members of the management team. In order to make sure that the decision maker in the
firm is indeed female, we repeat all regressions considering only firms with one owner-manager
(Appendix Tables 15, 16, 17).
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5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether female-owned firms differ in their investment
activity from male-owned firms. Our results offer valuable insights to gender differences in
investment behavior and enhance the understanding of the causes of smaller firm size for firms
owned by women. Even after controlling for other owner and firm characteristics we find that
women invest significantly less than men, at the extensive as well as at the intensive margin.
Furthermore, women react less to a marginal increase in cash flow, suggesting that even in the
presence of the same internal funds women invest less. This difference in the impact of cash flow
on investment rate is probably the most astonishing result in the paper. Of course we cannot
infer any statements about causality, the observed differences are mere correlations. However,
previous findings suggest that women are more risk and competition averse, less over-confident
and have different preferences in life. These personal traits are correlated with gender and are
likely to have a negative influence on investment behavior. Our estimation results confirm our
hypothesis that women invest less if these findings do not only hold for the average women but
for female entrepreneurs, too. Therefore, the significant gender effect from the regressions on the
extensive and intensive margin of investment possibly contains these unobserved features that
are best able to explain the differences in investment. An additional regression on investment
goals reveals that women are less likely to invest for reasons that indicate an ambition to expand
their businesses. This result points to the fact that women’s lower investment is attributable
rather to differences in preferences than to discrimination. However, size and growth are not the
only criteria for business success, pursuing lower-pace growth may also be beneficial for a firm.
Further research is needed in order to shed light on gender differences in business outcomes
after investment.
25
References
Addison, T., Schank, T., Schnabel, C. and J. Wagner (2007). Do works councils inhibit invest-
ment?, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 60(2), 187-203.
Allen, E., Langowitz, N. and M. Minniti (2007). Global entrepreneurship monitor, 2006 report
on women and entrepreneurship, The Center for Women’s Entrepreneurship at Babson College
and London Business School.
Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995). Another look at the instrumental-variable estimation of
error component models, Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-52.
Bartholomew, S. and A. D. Smith (2006). Improving survey response rates from chief execu-
tive officers in small firms: The importance of social networks, Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice 30 (1), 83-96.
Blanchflower, D. G. and A. J. Oswald (1998). What makes an entrepreneur? Journal of Labor
Economics 16(1), 26-60.
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel
data models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115-143.
Bond, S., Elston, J. A., Mairesse, J. and B. Mulkay (2003). Financial factors and investment
in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A comparison using company panel
data, The Review of Economics and Statistics 85(1), 153-165.
Bond, S. and J. Van Reenen (2007). Microeconometric models of investment and employment.
In: Heckman, J. and E. Leamer (eds.), Handbook of Econometrics. North Holland, London,
UK, 4417-4498.
Caliendo, M., Fossen, F.M. and A.S. Kritikos (2009). Risk attitudes of nascent entrepreneurs -
new evidence from an experimentally validated survey, Small Business Economics 32(2), 153-
167.
26
Cameron, C. and P. Trivedi (2009). Microeconometrics Using Stata, Stata Press, College Sta-
tion, Texas.
Cliff, J. (1998). Does one size fit all? Exploring the relationship between attitudes towards
growth, gender, and business size, Journal of Business Venturing 13, 523-542.
Cole, R. and H. Mehran (2009). Gender and the availability of credit to privately held firms:
evidence from the surveys of small business finances. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Report 383.
Croson, R. and U. Gneezy (2009). Gender differences in preferences, Journal of Economic
Literature 47(2), 448-474.
Dohmen, T. and A. Falk (2011). Performance pay and multi-dimensional sorting - productivity,
preferences and gender, The American Economic Review 101(2), 556-590.
Du Rietz, A. and M. Henrekson (2000). Testing the female underperformance hypothesis, Small
Business Economics 14, 1-10.
Dwyer, P., Gilkeson J. and J. List (2002). Gender differences in revealed risk taking: evidence
from mutual fund investors, Economics Letters 76, 151-158.
Fairlie, R. and A. Robb (2009). Gender differences in business performance: evidence from the
characteristics of business owners survey, Small Business Economics 33(4), 375-395.
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. and B. Petersen (1988). Financing constraints and corporate invest-
ment, Brookings Papers on Economic Policy 1988(1), 141-195.
Gneezy, U., Niederle, M. and A. Rustichini (2003). Performance in competitive environments:
Gender differences, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(3), 1049-1074.
Gottschalk, S. and M. Niefert (2011). Gender differences in business success of German start-up
firms. ZEW Discussion Paper 11-019.
27
Hakim, C. (2002). Lifestyle preferences as determinants of women’s differentiated labor market
careers, Work and Occupations 29(4), 428-459.
Johnson, J. and P. Powell (1994). Decision making, risk and gender: Are managers different?,
British Journal of Management 5, 123-138.
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales (1997). Do investment - cash flow sensitivies provide useful measures
of financing constraints?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1), 169-216.
Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund (2007). Do women shy away from competition? Do men com-
pete too much? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3), 1067-1101.
Odean, T. and B. Barber (2001). Boys will be boys: gender, overconfidence and common stock
investment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), 261-292.
Orobia, L., Sserwanga, A. and G. Rooks (2011). Risk taking and start-up capital: Exploring
gender differences in Uganda, through an international comparison, Journal of Economics and
Behavioral Studies 3(2), 83-93.
Reize, F. (2010). KfW-Mittelstandspanel 2010. Mittelstand: Stabil in der Krise - auch in
Zukunft leistungsstark durch Innovation, KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt am Main.
Robb, A. and J. Watson (2010). Comparing the performance of female- and male-controlled
SMEs: evidence from the United States and Australia, Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research
30(8), 1-12.
Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M. and H. W. Brachinger (1999). Financial decision-making:
Are women really more risk-averse?, American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings
89(2), 381-385.
Sexton, D. L. and N. Bowman-Upton (1990). Female and male entrepreneurs: Psychological
characteristics and their role in gender-related discrimination, Journal of Business Venturing
5(1), 29-36.
Sunden, A. and B. Surette (1998). Gender differences in the allocation of assets in retirement
28
savings plans, American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 88(2), 207-11.
Tobin, J. and W. Brainard (1977). Asset markets and the cost of capital, In: Nelson, R. and B.
Balassa (eds.):Economic progress, private values and public policy: Essays in honor of William
Fellner, North Holland, Amsterdam, 235-62.
Tonoyan, V. and R. Strohmeyer (2005). Employment growth and firm innovativeness: An
empirical investigation of women- and men-owned small ventures in Germany, In: Achleitner,
A.-K., H. Klandt, L. T. Koch & K.-I. Vogt (eds.): Jahrbuch Entrepreneurship 2005/2006,
Gründungsforschung und Gründungsmanagement. Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, New
York, 323-353.
Wooldridge, J. (2009). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Fourth Edition.
South Western.
29
Appendix
Table 9: Summary statistics regression sample intensive margin
Gender variable Mean St.dev.
Female owner (d) 0.115 0.318
t-test 
Mean St.dev. Min. Max. Mean St.dev. Min. Max. p-value
Dependent variable
Inv./lagged sales, 2008/2009 0.049 0.094 0 1.063 0.035 0.060 0 0.413 0.079*
Independent variables
Inv./lagged sales, 2006/2007 0.065 0.116 0 1.232 0.056 0.111 0 1.028 0.371
Av. growth rate sales 2008/2009 0.001 0.149 -0.605 0.974 -0.008 0.126 -0.412 0.366 0.461
FTE (log) 37.4 54.5 0.5 822 23.2 30.5 1 162 0.001***
Cash flow/lagged sales 2008/2009 0.114 0.129 -0.198 1.184 0.142 0.177 -0.110 0.823 0.015**
Interaction cash flow*female 0.026 0.014 -0.226 0.707
Sales expectation for 2010 pos. (d) 0.322 0.467 0 1 0.316 0.466 0 1 0.872
Sales expectation for 2009 pos. (d) 0.144 0.351 0 1 0.142 0.350 0 1 0.938
Ambitious investment goals (d) 0.567 0.496 0 1 0.484 0.501 0 1 0.049**
Stratification variables and industry dummies
KfW support (d) 0.784 0.412 0 1 0.761 0.428 0 1 0.526
Region (d) 0.414 0.493 0 1 0.419 0.495 0 1 0.900
Manufacturing+other (d) 0.341 0.474 0 1 0.206 0.406 0 1 0.001***
Construction (d) 0.185 0.388 0 1 0.090 0.287 0 1 0.003***
Retail and wholesale (d) 0.260 0.439 0 1 0.303 0.461 0 1 0.252
Services (d) 0.214 0.410 0 1 0.400 0.491 0 1 0.000***
Legal form dummies
Sole proprietorship (d) 0.271 0.444 0 1 0.393 0.490 0 1 0.001***
Private limited (d) 0.070 0.256 0 1 0.103 0.305 0 1 0.143
Limited liability (d) 0.118 0.323 0 1 0.071 0.258 0 1 0.079*
Corporation (d) 0.532 0.499 0 1 0.419 0.495 0 1 0.008***
Other legal form (d) 0.008 0.090 0 1 0.013 0.113 0 1 0.543
Male owner Female owner
Notes: this table provides summary statistics for the reduced sample used in the estimation of a OLS model of investment in Table 3.5. 
N=1,389. Only firms that are observable from 2006-2009 and firms that have invested at least once in those years are included. 
Comparison of means with two-sample t-test of equality of means under the assumption of equal variances. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 10: Linear probability RE panel GLS model with interactions (size)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: 
investment (0/1) with size cat
with size cat 
& size interact
Female owner (d) -0.033*** -0.120***
(0.012) (0.039)
2/2.5 empl 0.041* 0.025
(0.022) (0.025)
3/3.5 empl 0.047** 0.028
(0.024) (0.026)
4-5.5 empl 0.099*** 0.075***
(0.023) (0.025)
6-7.5 empl 0.106*** 0.095***
(0.024) (0.026)
8-11.5 empl 0.167*** 0.147***
(0.024) (0.026)
12-14.5 empl 0.183*** 0.167***
(0.027) (0.029)
15-19.5 empl 0.247*** 0.229***
(0.027) (0.028)
20-34.5 empl 0.248*** 0.232***
(0.028) (0.029)
35-59 empl 0.262*** 0.243***
(0.030) (0.031)
>60 empl 0.297*** 0.278***
(0.032) (0.033)
fem*2/2.5 empl 0.078
(0.051)
fem*3/3.5 empl 0.092
(0.058)
fem*4-5.5 empl 0.131***
(0.051)
fem*6-7.5 empl 0.044
(0.053)
fem*8-11.5 empl 0.105**
(0.050)
fem*12-14.5 empl 0.075
(0.061)
fem*15-19.5 empl 0.090
(0.056)
fem*20-34.5 empl 0.070
(0.052)
fem*35-59 empl 0.118**
(0.054)
fem*>60 empl 0.111**
(0.052)
Firm age -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Lagged sales (log) 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.005)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008)
3 or more managers 0.018 0.018
/owners (d) (0.012) (0.012)
Graduate (d) 0.017** 0.017**
(0.008) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.007)
Innovation activities (d) 0.108*** 0.108***
(0.007) (0.007)
Sales growth 0.160*** 0.160***
(0.011) (0.011)
Cash flow 2.82e-08*** 2.83e-08***
(4.85e-09) (4.86e-09)
Constant -0.070 -0.050
(0.066) (0.067)
R-squared 0.169 0.176
Observations 20,254 20,254
Female observations 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for the 
years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes 
time dummies and the stratification variables. The reference category are manufacturing 
firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.
*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 11: Linear probability RE panel GLS model with interactions (age)
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: 
investment (0/1) with age cat
with age cat 
& age interact
Female owner (d) -0.036*** -0.055
-0.012 (0.038)
3 -<6 y. -0.042** -0.051**
(0.018) (0.020)
6 -<9 y. -0.070*** -0.075***
(0.019) (0.020)
9 -<13 y. -0.055*** -0.056***
(0.018) (0.020)
13 -<17 y. -0.084*** -0.082***
(0.018) (0.020)
17 -<20 y. -0.081*** -0.085***
(0.020) (0.021)
20 -<30 y. -0.067*** -0.069***
(0.020) (0.022)
30 -<50 y. -0.057*** -0.060***
(0.019) (0.021)
50 to 80 y. -0.071*** -0.079***
(0.020) (0.021)
>80 y. -0.077*** -0.080***
(0.020) (0.021)
fem*3 -<6 y. 0.048
(0.046)
fem*6 -<9 y. 0.028
(0.050)
fem*9 -<13 y. 0.004
(0.049)
fem*13 -<17 y. -0.030
(0.049)
fem*17 -<20 y. 0.021
(0.058)
fem*20 -<30 y. 0.005
(0.057)
fem*30 -<50 y. 0.020
(0.055)
fem*50-80 y. 0.074
(0.054)
fem*>80 y. 0.018
(0.049)
Firm size 0.069*** 0.069***
(number of FTE) (0.006) (0.006)
Lagged sales (log) 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.005) (0.005)
2 managers/owners (d) 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.008)
3 or more managers 0.015 0.015
/owners (d) (0.012) (0.012)
Graduate (d) 0.016* 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008)
Age firm owner -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.007) (0.007)
Innovation activities (d) 0.109*** 0.109***
(0.007) (0.007)
Sales growth 0.156*** 0.155***
(0.011) (0.011)
Cash flow 1.42e-08*** 1.43e-08***
(4.85e-09) (4.86e-09)
Constant -0.079 -0.077
(0.066) (0.066)
R-squared 0.170 0.175
Observations 20,254 20,254
Female observations 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for 
the years 2003-2009 with firm-level cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes
time dummies and the stratification variables. The reference category are manufacturing 
firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have one owner-manager.
*,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
32
Table 12: Panel random effects probit model of investment
Dependent variable: investment (0/1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.446*** -0.398*** -0.188*** -0.181*** -0.123**
(0.054) (0.055) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.450*** 0.268*** 0.198***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.025)
Lagged sales (log) 0.179*** 0.252***
(0.021) (0.022)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.222*** -0.156***
(0.046) (0.046)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.295*** -0.208***
(0.048) (0.048)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.268*** -0.168***
(0.048) (0.048)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.141*** 0.110***
(0.037) (0.037)
3 or more managers/owners (d) 0.135** 0.090*
(0.054) (0.053)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.225*** 0.172***
(0.030) (0.030)
Graduate (d) 0.103*** 0.051
(0.034) (0.033)
Age firm owner -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Innovation activities (d) 0.465***
(0.028)
Sales growth 0.690***
(0.046)
Cash flow/lagged sales 0.342***
(0.065)
Demeaned cash flow*female 0.285
(0.183)
Constant 0.463*** 0.755*** -0.658*** -2.345*** -3.583***
(0.0390) (0.0496) (0.0580) (0.252) (0.262)
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Legal form dummies no no no yes yes
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Observations 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254 20,254
Female Observations 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361 2,361
Firms 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949 9,949
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel probit regression for the years 2003-2009 with firm-
level cluster-robust standard errors. All regressions include time and legal form dummies as well as the stratification 
variables. The reference category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years and have 
one owner-manager. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 13: Panel probit regression of investment goals
Dependent variable:
Investment goal (0/1)
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Other
goals
Female owner (d) -0.153 -0.036 -0.193** 0.049 -0.535*** 0.151 -0.205** 0.158
(0.129) (0.082) (0.079) (0.072) (0.178) (0.122) (0.084) (0.099)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.026 0.255*** -0.016 -0.008 0.032 -0.0148 0.146*** -0.096*
(0.063) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.080) (0.067) (0.044) (0.057)
Lagged sales (log) 0.104* -0.035 0.012 0.047 0.087 0.059 0.004 -0.011
(0.055) (0.037) (0.036) (0.033) (0.070) (0.058) (0.0380) (0.049)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.015 0.162* -0.029 0.014 -0.002 0.158 -0.100 -0.056
(0.143) (0.088) (0.084) (0.079) (0.157) (0.140) (0.090) (0.116)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.052 0.038 -0.109 0.209*** -0.240 -0.045 -0.219** -0.096
(0.132) (0.085) (0.081) (0.076) (0.155) (0.139) (0.087) (0.112)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.163 0.123 -0.201** 0.257*** -0.505*** 0.154 -0.397*** -0.117
(0.131) (0.086) (0.082) (0.077) (0.161) (0.136) (0.088) (0.113)
Sales expect. positive (d) -0.153** -0.010 0.179*** -0.156*** 0.302*** -0.011 0.553*** -0.016
(0.071) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043) (0.080) (0.077) (0.047) (0.065)
Graduate owner (d) -0.309*** 0.014 -0.117** 0.002 0.340*** -0.174** -0.196*** 0.059
(0.081) (0.054) (0.051) (0.048) (0.105) (0.086) (0.055) (0.070)
Age firm owner -0.005 -0.002 0.0002 -0.007*** 0.008 -0.009** -0.003 -0.0007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
2 owners/managers (d) 0.058 -0.028 0.014 0.015 0.070 0.013 0.063 -0.041
(0.082) (0.056) (0.053) (0.050) (0.097) (0.089) (0.057) (0.077)
3 or more owners/managers (d) -0.081 0.061 -0.123* 0.009 0.041 -0.131 -0.004 0.154
(0.114) (0.077) (0.074) (0.069) (0.132) (0.129) (0.078) (0.102)
Sales growth 0.216 0.113 -0.091 -0.046 0.094 -0.049 0.631*** -0.305**
(0.134) (0.086) (0.085) (0.080) (0.149) (0.146) (0.091) (0.123)
Cash flow in t/Sales t-1 -0.027 0.007 0.0003 -0.010 -0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.054
(0.050) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.067)
Constant -2.780*** 0.092 -0.535 -0.123 -3.841*** -2.142*** -0.345 -1.530***
(0.671) (0.450) (0.433) (0.400) (0.866) (0.707) (0.460) (0.594)
Observations 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194
Female observations 726 726 726 726 726 726 726 726
Firms 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999 3,999
Avg. obs. per firm 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: This table presents the results of a panel probit regression with robust standard errors for the years 2005-2009. Only investing firms considered. Each 
regression includes industry dummies as well as a dummy for region and participation in a promotional loan program. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 14: Random effects panel tobit regression of investment
Dependent Variable: 
Investment rate
(investment/sales) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Investment/sales t-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Sales growth    0.101***    0.085***  0.085***   0.084***    0.060***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash flow in t/sales t-1 0.096*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.105***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Interaction cash flow*female -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.075***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Sales expect. pos. (d) 0.031*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002)
Ambitious investment goals (d) 0.145***
(0.002)
Constant -0.006 -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.070***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 23,130 23,130 23,130 23,130 23,130
left-censored 8,515 8,515 8,515 8,515 8,515
uncensored 14,615 14,615 14,615 14,615 14,615
Female obs. 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673
Firms 10,966 10,966 10,966 10,966 10,966
Avg. obs. per firm 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression  for the years 2003-2009.  
Each regression includes industry and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The reference 
category are manufacturing firms that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 15: Linear probability random effects panel GLS model of investment
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent variable: investment (0/1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.129*** -0.119*** -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.045***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.107*** 0.057*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Lagged sales (log) 0.051*** 0.070***
(0.007) (0.007)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) -0.051*** -0.035**
(0.015) (0.015)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) -0.059*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.015)
Firm age >20 years (d) -0.056*** -0.031**
(0.015) (0.015)
Sales expect. positive (d) 0.062*** 0.048***
(0.009) (0.009)
Graduate (d) 0.026** 0.010
(0.011) (0.011)
Age firm owner -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Innovation activities (d) 0.124***
(0.009)
Sales growth 0.165***
(0.015)
Cash flow/lagged sales 0.110***
(0.030)
Demeaned cash flow*female 0.056
(0.054)
Constant 0.575*** 0.647*** 0.352*** -0.0930 -0.419***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.082) (0.082)
Industry dummies no yes yes yes yes
Legal form dummies no no no yes yes
R-squared 0.023 0.035 0.116 0.133 0.17
Observations 11,918 11,918 11,918 11,918 11,918
Female observations 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427 1,427
Firms 6,244 6,244 6,244 6,244 6,244
Avg. obs. per firm 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel GLS regression for the years 2003-2009 with firm-level 
cluster-robust standard errors. The regression includes time dummies and the stratification variables. The reference 
category are manufacturing firms in sole proprietorship that are younger than 5 years.*,** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 16: Random effects panel tobit regression of investment
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent variable: 
Investment/sales (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female owner (d) -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Investment/sales t-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales growth 0.106***   0.090***    0.090***  0.089***    0.062***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Cash flow in t/sales t-1 0.090***   0.094***  0.097***    0.090***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Interaction cash flow*female -0.040 -0.041* -0.034
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
Sales expect. pos. (d) 0.036*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.003)
Ambitious Inv. goals (d) 0.166***
(0.003)
Constant -0.016* -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.044*** -0.080***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 13,551 13,551 13,551 13,551 13,551
left-censored 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642
uncensored 7,909 7,909 7,909 7,909 7,909
Female observations 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580
Firms 6,852 6,852 6,852 6,852 6,852
Avg. obs. per firm 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Notes: This table presents the results of a random effects panel tobit regression  for the years 2003-
2009.  Each regression includes industry and time dummies as well as the stratification variables. The 
reference category are manufacturing firms that are younger than 5 years. *,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 17: Linear probability model of investment goals
(only firms with 1 owner-manager)
Dependent variable:
Investment goal (0/1)
Environm.
protection
Rational-
ization
Implement.
new prod.
Technical
replacem.
Innovation/
 R&D
Governm.
requirem.
Sales 
increase
Other
goals
Female owner (d) -0.036** -0.047 -0.011 -0.015 -0.050*** 0.014 -0.065** 0.004
(0.015) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.015) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018)
Lagged FTE (log) 0.010 0.063*** -0.011 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.045*** -0.011
(0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008)
Lagged sales (log) 0.0005 -0.009 0.011 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007)
Firm age 5-10 years (d) 0.011 0.037 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.004 -0.035 -0.008
(0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018)
Firm age 11-20 years (d) 0.022 0.022 -0.036 0.089*** -0.024 -0.005 -0.067** -0.018
(0.017) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.030) (0.018)
Firm age >20 years (d) 0.046*** 0.024 -0.063** 0.104*** -0.034* 0.004 -0.110*** -0.021
(0.017) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018)
Sales expect. positive (d) -0.020* -0.004 0.049*** -0.023 0.025** -0.013 0.156*** 0.002
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010)
Graduate owner (d) -0.021* 0.001 -0.030* -0.003 0.030** -0.020** -0.072*** 0.011
(0.012) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011)
Age firm owner -0.001* -0.001 -0.0004 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001** 4.56e-05 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales growth 0.040** 0.025 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.023 0.167*** -0.060***
(0.020) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.020) (0.017) (0.032) (0.018)
Cash flow in t/Sales t-1 -5.93e-05 0.001*** 0.0003 -0.002*** -0.0004** 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Constant 0.157 0.591*** 0.261* 0.601*** 0.026 0.132 0.366** 0.036
(0.108) (0.169) (0.148) (0.166) (0.101) (0.089) (0.163) (0.085)
R-squared overall 0.031 0.052 0.036 0.030 0.071 0.022 0.033 0.090
Observations 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949 3,949
Female observations 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369
Firms 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336 2,336
Avg. obs. per firm 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Notes: This table presents the results of an random effects panel regression with robust standard errors for the years 2005-2009. Only investing 
firms with one owner-manager considered. The definitions and constructions of the variables can be found in Table 1. Each regression includes 
industry dummies as well as a dummy for region and participation in a promotional loan program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *,** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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